

3050

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)

CIA | ALA | AR 94-010

~~Secret~~

11 MAY 1994



Directorate of Intelligence

POOR ORIGINAL

Africa Review

9 May 1994

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: FEB 2004

~~Secret~~

ALA AR 94-010  
9 May 1994

Copy 240

30

3052

~~Secret~~

**Africa Review** ☐

9 May 1994

		<i>Page</i>
Articles	<b>Rwanda: Can Talks and Power Sharing Be Restarted?</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	1

☐

Given the depth of animosity between Rwanda's Hutus and Tutsis, the extent of current bloodletting, and the deaths of many key political figures, there is no certainty that negotiations can be restarted or that a power-sharing interim government can be installed. ☐

3053

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~Africa Review ☐

## Articles

**Rwanda: Can Talks and Power  
Sharing Be Restarted?** ☐

Africa provides relatively few examples of deeply divided, multiethnic countries that have revamped political structures to try to lessen internal conflict. Given the depth of historic animosity between Rwanda's majority Hutus and minority Tutsis, the extent of current bloodletting, and the deaths of many key political figures, there is no certainty that negotiations can be restarted and hold up or that a power-sharing interim government can be installed as called for by the 1993 Arusha accord the two sides signed. Moreover, Rwanda is vulnerable to negative developments in neighboring Burundi, which has similarly hostile Hutu-Tutsi groups, suggesting that stability in the region is unlikely without mutually reinforcing political solutions being found in each country. ☐

**OAU Involvement Probably Will Remain Limited**

The Organization of African Unity will probably continue to look first at the UN, Washington, and neighboring countries to take the lead to mediate Rwanda's crisis, while trying to play a helpful supplemental role if possible. Member states will discuss Rwanda at the 6-11 June council of ministers meeting that precedes this year's OAU summit in Tunisia. The discussion will include the UN Secretary General's call to insert an OAU peacekeeping force that would require outside financial and logistic support. The secretaries general of the OAU and UN disagree about which organization should take the lead in organizing any new peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, and whether it should be made up exclusively of African troops under OAU direction, as UN Secretary Boutros Ghali has proposed. OAU Secretary General Salim has stated that any expanded peacekeeping presence in Rwanda should be organized under UN auspices and build on the existing UNAMIR presence to include African and non-African troops. He has promised to approach African countries to try to contribute some of the necessary troops. It is unclear, however, how much enthusiasm Africans have for participating in a Rwandan operation. Even if agreed on, organizing such a force would prove time consuming as demonstrated by the

experience of getting forces from Tanzania and Uganda to Liberia to assist West African peacekeepers already there. ☐

While deeply concerned about Rwanda, the OAU is still trying to get its 47-member military observer mission in Burundi fully in place and operational; this effort has been under way since last November. The OAU was sharply critical of the UN Security Council's 21 April decision to withdraw all but 270 of the 2,500 UNAMIR peace monitors from Rwanda, calling the action shortsighted and callous; the UN established the UNAMIR mission last October. Egyptian President Mubarak, the outgoing OAU chairman, who is scheduled to be replaced by Tunisian President Ben Ali, has publicly called on the UN to maintain and bolster its role in Rwanda. Between September 1992 and October 1993, the OAU—in its first such operation ever—placed a 50-man Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda that tried with mixed success to monitor the cease-fire that government and rebel forces agreed to as they negotiated what became the Arusha accord. ☐

**Satisfying Ethnic Needs**

For many Africans, ethnic or tribal membership satisfies a fundamental need for acceptance, recognition, participation, autonomy, and security. Conflict often arises when a particular tribal group finds itself in a multiethnic society where it perceives, or where there is evidence, that these needs are threatened, suppressed, or not sufficiently accommodated and protected in attempted political solutions. Reinforced by previous winner-take-all political systems and the paucity of economic resources to go around, dominant or competing ethnic groups have found it difficult to surrender or share power. Most, including Rwanda, also have a tradition of a highly centralized, unitary state. ☐

Rwanda's ethnic problems are compounded by memories of Tutsi feudal dominance before independence and cycles of past bloodletting: a Hutu rebellion wracked the

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

country just before independence in 1962, which was followed by large-scale Hutu massacres of Tutsis. Today, there are sharp divisions within each ethnic side between hardliners and moderates; Hutu militants are perpetrating much of the killing of Hutu moderates and Tutsi civilians. Hutus are also divided between northerners and southerners, with the former resenting the prominence of the latter under President Habyarimana, whose assassination set off Rwanda's crisis. ☐

#### Revisiting Arusha

Talks may not be possible until Rwanda's two sides are exhausted by fighting or one sues for peace. An outright victor could try to impose a solution outside the framework of the Arusha accord, which provided for a process for giving the minority Tutsi a share of power within what has been a Hutu-controlled political system since independence. Moreover, Zairian President Mobutu—with the encouragement of some elements in the French Government—may complicate the situation by trying to insert himself into any talks on Rwanda's future. ☐

Even if negotiations can be restarted based on the 1993 Arusha accord, talks risk bogging down in haggling over punishing the perpetrators of recent violence—including the fate of hardline Hutu militias, and the division of cabinet seats. Consideration of longer term issues is essential to restore ethnic faith in the process. Angola's experience suggests that it is unwise to proceed to multiparty elections without prior agreement on the future structure of a permanent political system. ☐

The Arusha accord focuses on interim power sharing at the national level by installing a broad-based transitional government coalition to organize elections while military integration of rival forces occurs. Beyond this, no blueprint of the country's future constitutional structure is hinted at, except to charge the transitional government with organizing a national debate and drafting a new constitution. There is no guarantee that the old winner-take-all Constitution will be scrapped or power-sharing institutionalized at national and regional levels. Assurances of—or at least the prospect of—greater group rights and a share of power after elections could increase ethnic trust and confidence and, over time, perhaps ease their dependence on armed militias and resort to decimation of rivals. ☐

Any lasting Rwandan settlement will have to deal with the Tutsi diaspora in exile, particularly their claim to property rights and land access in a desperately poor and densely settled country. Some 300,000 Tutsis in exile provide the political and military base of the Rwanda Popular Front rebels. ☐

Meanwhile, the informal partition of Rwanda appears to be under way, with Tutsi forces dominating the Tutsi and Hutu populated north and east while Hutus prevail in the south, the northwest, and in most of Kigali, which also have Tutsi and Hutu populations. If partition solidifies, this new reality will have to be taken into account. It could provide the basis for mediators to explore the acceptability of regional autonomy or confederation—including reliance on civil police at the regional level in place of the national military—to lessen strife. ☐

#### Constitutional Engineering

A handful of African states have tried, with mixed success, to devise political structures to defuse and contain ethnic strife. All experiments—which require a willingness to fine-tune imperfections over the long run—have been born out of prolonged civil strife or struggle for ethnic rights, and involve some form of decentralization. Federalism in Nigeria and Ethiopia was imposed by military victors; negotiated settlements provide for regional governments in South Africa and an autonomous north in Mali. Federal systems with strong centers in South Africa—and in Nigeria under past civilian rule—afford oppositions and ethnic groups that are defeated nationally with a regional refuge and at least some stake in the system. ☐

Several unhappy South African groups want greater power for the provinces than the five-year transition Constitution provides. Nigeria's system has been marred more by rampant corruption, military manipulation, and a culture of political intolerance than by any inherent structural flaws. Ethiopia's ethnic-based regions theoretically have substantial power, but the Meles regime calls the shots in this loose national structure that offers one alternative to Somali-style fragmentation in the Horn of Africa. Mali is struggling to find resources necessary to implement regional autonomy promised for its now largely quiescent northern Tuareg rebels. ☐

Political settlements in Mali and South Africa provide for the integration of armed rivals into national armies; Ethiopia and Nigeria selectively integrated crushed civil war foes. Ethiopia is trying to build up local police

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

forces in its 14 regions to reduce the resented presence of the ethnic Tigray-dominated national military. Nigeria has continued sporadically since the 1967-70 civil war to base military recruitment on the country's federal character. Mali, having integrated 600 Tuareg combatants as required by its 1992 peace pact, faces new rebel demands to merge four times that number—causing the regular military serious misgivings. ☐

#### Other Alternatives

When agreement proves impossible on power sharing and formulas for autonomy of ethnic groups through federalism and regional government, internationally recognized partition or secession are alternative, though generally less satisfactory, ways to ease ethnic conflict. Neither step has yet been demanded by Rwanda's contending groups. The country's neighbors and the OAU would probably regard partition and secession as worst case, last-resort solutions, fearing the unleashing of similar demands by disgruntled ethnic groups elsewhere. The OAU charter frowns on ethnic self-determination by enshrining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states as cardinal principles:

- **Partition.** There is no precedent for formal partition in Africa. Partition lines between groups cannot be drawn with any exactitude without leaving a residue of ethnic squabbling. In Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis

have historically been intermingled in settlement patterns, which would make any partition very difficult without massive population relocation. In the case of Cyprus, partition has required the indefinite presence of an international monitoring force. Partition may also make a country's parts economically unviable and dependent on international humanitarian and other aid.

- **Secession.** Eritrea's formal independence from Ethiopia—sanctioned by Addis Ababa and an internationally supported referendum, and reluctantly acceded to by the OAU—has set a secessionist precedent.<sup>1</sup> However, Eritrea's strong historical and legal grounds for independence are absent in both Rwanda and Burundi. Eritrea was a distinct former European colony, with an independent economic base dating from Italian rule, that was denied the right of self-determination after WW II ended. Moreover, Eritrea represents a broad amalgam of nine Christian and Muslim groups, rather than a narrow projection of ethnic chauvinism as in breakaway Somaliland which has won no foreign recognition. ☐


<sup>1</sup> Older African precedents exist. In 1961, British-administered West Cameroon held a UN-plebiscite resulting in the north joining Nigeria and the rest joining French Cameroon to form today's independent state. In 1956, French Togoland voted under UN-supervision to become today's Togo. In 1957, British Togoland voted to join Ghana. ☐

☐

~~Secret~~



3057

~~Secret~~



3058

~~Secret~~




~~Secret~~




3059

~~Secret~~



3060


~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~


3061

~~Secret~~



3062

~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~

3063

~~Secret~~

3064


~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~

3065


~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~

3066

~~Secret~~




~~Secret~~




3067

~~Secret~~



3068

~~Secret~~



3069

~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~

3070

~~Secret~~

## Sub-Saharan Africa:

### Democratization Chronology

6 April Through 3 May 1994

6 April

The presidents of *Rwanda* and *Burundi*—returning from a regional summit in *Tanzania*—are killed when their aircraft is shot down while landing in Kigali. Burundi remains calm, but Rwanda's Hutu-dominated Presidential Guard and Hutu militia—blaming the Tutsi rebels for the assassinations—embark on a rampage against Tutsis and Hutu moderates. The country's moderate Hutu Prime Minister is killed along with several UN peacekeeping soldiers from Belgium. Rwanda's Tutsi rebels break encampment, resume fighting, and start moving from their enclave in the north on the capital. The *UN*, *OAU*, and Western donors condemn violence.


8 April

*Rwanda's* radio announces an interim government to replace the one headed by slain President Habyarimana. The new regime is rejected by the country's ethnic Tutsi rebel minority, who claim it is dominated by Hutu hardliners opposed to power sharing as called for by the 1993 Arusha peace accord. New President Sindikubwabo, a former Speaker of Parliament, is from late President Habyarimana's MRND Party, while Prime Minister Kambanda belongs to the more hardline, anti-Tutsi faction of the MDR Hutu opposition party. The rebels declare their intent to seize control, restore order, and hold talks with other groups to form a broad-based transitional government leading to multiparty elections.

~~Secret~~

3071


~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~

3072

~~Secret~~



**12 April**

**Rwanda's ethnic Hutu-dominated interim government flees Kigali for the south as Tutsi rebel troops take control of several key points in and around the city while Hutu-Tutsi violence and killings spread to six of the country's 10 prefectures.**



~~Secret~~

3073

~~Secret~~

[Redacted]

An emergency meeting of the central organ of the *OAU's* conflict resolution mechanism in Addis Ababa condemns *Rwanda's* violence, calls on the government and rebels to negotiate, and affirms the 1993 Arusha peace accord as the only viable framework for reconciliation. The OAU also appeals for the *UN* peacekeeping mission to remain in Rwanda. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~Secret~~

3074

~~Secret~~


The *UN* Security Council reduces the size of the UN Assistance Mission in *Rwanda* (UNAMIR) from 2,500 to a 270-man security and military observer contingent whose task is to press the warring Hutus and Tutsis for a cease-fire and permit the resumption of humanitarian relief operations. ☐

~~Secret~~



3075

~~Secret~~




~~Secret~~

3076


~~Secret~~

Looking Ahead: May Through July



3077

~~Secret~~



22 June

The *UN* mandate expires—unless renewed—for the UN Observer Mission in *Uganda-Rwanda* (UNOMUR), whose task is monitor the border to prevent war materials from reaching Rwanda's ethnic Tutsi rebels. ☐



~~Secret~~